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Abstract
Recently, high-speed IPv4 scanners, such as ZMap, have enabled rapid and timely collection of TLS
certificates and other security-sensitive parameters. Such large datasets led to the development of the
Censys search interface, facilitating comprehensive analysis of TLS deployments in the wild. Several
recent studies analyzed TLS certificates as deployed in web servers. Beyond public web servers, TLS
is deployed in many other Internet-connected devices, at home and enterprise environments, and at
network backbones. In this paper, we report the results of a preliminary analysis using Censys on TLS
deployments in such devices (e.g., routers, modems, NAS, printers, SCADA, and IoT devices in general).
We compare certificates and TLS connection parameters from a security perspective, as found in common
devices with Alexa 1M sites. Our results highlight significant weaknesses, and may serve as a catalyst to
improve TLS security for these devices.
1 Introduction
Beyond user-level computing devices and back-end servers, there are many other Internet-connected devices
that serve important roles in everyday IT operations. Such devices include routers, modems, printers, cam-
eras, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) controllers, DVR (digital video recorders), HVAC
(heating, ventilating and air conditioning technology), CPS (cyber physical systems), and NAS (network-
attached storage) devices. Several past studies have identified critical security issues in these devices, includ-
ing authentication bypass, hard-coded passwords and keys, misconfiguration, serious flaws in their firmware
and web interfaces; example studies include: [28], [11], [10], [8], [9], [26]. The recent massive DDoS attack
on DynDNS as attributed to the Mirai botnet (e.g., [27]), populated by DVRs, IP cameras and other IoT
devices, shows the clear danger of security flaws and weaknesses in these devices.
Over the years, manufacturers of networked devices have implemented some security mechanisms, notably,
the adoption of SSL/TLS for communication with other devices. With the help of the ZMap [18] high-speed
IPv4 scanner, some recent projects analyzed the TLS ecosystem for web, email and SSH servers, and identified
and measured significant security issues in TLS deployments in the wild; see e.g., [17], [23], [16], [1].
Heninger et al. [22] highlighted faulty random number generators in networked devices (see also the recent
follow-up work [21]). Chung et al. [7] analyzed over 80 million invalid TLS certificates, and attribute most
of them to network devices, including modems/home routers, VPNs, NAS, firewalls, IP cameras and IPTVs.
However, we are unaware of any comprehensive study on the overall TLS ecosystem for networked devices. In
this paper, we report our results on analyzing certificates and TLS parameters from 299,858 devices (out of
1,018,911), collected from the Censys (censys.io) service on October 8, 2016. Unsurprisingly, many devices
still use crypto primitives that are currently being phased out from modern browsers and web servers.
Specifically, we found a significant number of devices use unsafe RSA 512-bit keys (4100 certificates)
and 768-bit keys (8919 certificates). The vulnerable/deprecated RC4 stream cipher is still widely used in
devices (113,186, 37.7%). A large number of devices (66,540, 22.2%; 19,063) also use (deprecated) SSLv3
∗This is the tech-report version (March 17, 2017) of an FC 2017 paper [29]; new additions: analysis on certificate issuers,
certificate reuse, DH prime number reuse, stronger cipher suites, and device type ranking (Section 4).
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and SSLv2, respectively. We also compare TLS security parameters between devices and Alexa Top 1M
sites, which clearly highlight the differences in these two domains. In all security aspects that we consider
(SSL/TLS version, signature, encryption and hashing algorithms, and RSA key length), all device types are
significantly more vulnerable than Alexa 1M sites. Our analysis focuses on TLS security weaknesses, but we
also summarize the use of stronger security primitives in devices and Alexa 1M sites. We hope our results,
albeit preliminary, to serve as a catalyst to quick fixing of TLS issues in devices, so that these devices do
not remain less secure than the HTTPS/web ecosystem in the long run.
2 Related work
We briefly discuss measurement studies on real-world TLS deployments.
To allow researchers to analyze SSL certificates, the EFF SSL Observatory project [19] offered the first
large-scale, open certificate repository containing SSL certificates for the IPv4 address space in 2010. Later,
in 2013, Durumeric et al. [17] analyzed the ZMap collected data over a period of 14 months to uncover
all public certificate authorities (CAs) and the certificates they issued. Censys [15] is a search engine used
to query information of hosts and networks stored in daily ZMap scans. As an example application for
Censys, the prevalence of the unauthenticated Modbus protocol among SCADA systems has been studied.
Numerous such systems have been found across the globe. However, non-SCADA devices, specifically,
the TLS ecosystem for those devices have not been studied. We extend existing work to understand the
TLS ecosystem for networked devices, mostly used at home, enterprise, and industrial environments, and
physical/network infrastructures.
Heninger et al. [22] reported in 2012 that RSA/DSA algorithms as used specifically in embedded network
devices are vulnerable due to faulty random number generators. They found that 0.75% of TLS certificates
share keys, and RSA private keys can be easily calculated for 0.50% of TLS hosts (also reported similar
results for RSA/DSA keys as used in the SSH protocol). However, other TLS/certificate parameters were
not analyzed in this study.
Pa et al. [26] propose the IoT honeypot (IoTPOT) to analyze malware attacks against devices such as
home routers, smart fridges, and other IoT devices. Their honeypot data also shows significant increase in
Telnet-based attacks, including DDoS, against IoT devices. Costin et al. [8] devise a platform to find possible
reuse of fingerprints of SSL certificates, public/private keys of devices in ZMap datasets; many devices were
found with reused keys.
Shodan.io is a search engine similar to Censys, targeted towards IoT devices (full access requires paid
subscriptions). In addition to IPv4 devices, Shodan claimed to have scanned millions of IPv6 addresses,
reportedly by exploiting a loophole in the NTP Pool Project [3]. Arnaert et al. [2] highlight challenges in
aggregating search results from Shodan and Censys, and propose an ontology to make these engines more
usable and effective for finding vulnerable IoT devices.
3 Methodology and device info
We rely on the Censys [15] search engine for our analysis. In this section, we provide a brief overview of
Censys, and detail our methodology.
Censys enables querying data from the Internet-wide scan repository (scans.io), a data repository
hosting the periodic scan results as collected by the ZMap scanner [18]. Censys tags the collected data with
security-related properties and device types, allowing easy but powerful search queries through its online
search interface and REST API. Censys also tags TLS and certificate data of Alexa Top 1M web sites.
Tagging is done by annotating the raw scan data with additional metadata, e.g., type and manufacturer
for devices, and Alexa ranking for sites. The output from the application scanners is used to identify
device-specific metadata. The annotation process involves ZTag (paired with ZMap and ZGrab), allowing
researchers to add logic to define metadata for currently untagged devices [15]. Apparently, search capabilities
in Censys is still evolving (not all device metadata is defined in ZTag, although ZTag can be extended by other











Infra. router 23.31 237,540 11.61 118,259
Modem 15.56 158,558 2.53 25,724
Camera 14.11 143,721 0.69 6809
NAS 7.07 71,997 5.45 55,503
Home router 5.04 51,347 2.52 25,667
Network 0.00 3 3.91 39,857
Printer 1.00 10,148 2.19 22,296
Scada 2.45 24,909 0.37 3773
CPS 1.26 12,820 0.09 868
Media 0.79 8000 0.11 1102
Total 70.57 719,043 29.43 299,858
Table 1: Type-wise device distribution
Table 1 lists available device types ex-
tracted from Censys, divided by TLS sup-
port. We further group some device types from
Censys for easier presentation as follows: mo-
dem (cable/DSL), printer (all printer models,
print servers), network (generic network de-
vices, network analyzers), SCADA (scada con-
troller, router, gateway, server, frontend), me-
dia (set-top box, digital video recorders, VoIP,
cinema), CPS (PLC, HVAC, industrial control
system, water flow controller, light controller,
power distribution unit, power monitor, power
controller). Certain device types (e.g., CPS)
appear to be small in numbers. This may be
due to the fact that the tagging process in Cen-
sys is still not very comprehensive. We do not consider some devices that are very low in number (e.g., 10
USB devices). The devices appear to come from all around the world (75 countries with >1000 devices);
the top 10 countries host about 56% of all devices, including: Germany 17.9%, USA 15.0%, India 4.9%, and
China 4.4%.
For comparison, we chose the Alexa Top 1M sites. Data extracted from Censys was transformed to an
intermediary format that requires a resource-intensive post-processing phase. Search queries can be executed
on Censys in two ways: a RESTful web API or an SQL interface engine. We used the latter option (with the
help of a Censys author), as it is more efficient for large-scale search results. After the TLS parameters and
certificates are extracted for devices and Alexa 1M sites, we first analyze our selected security parameters
and algorithms in devices. We then compare the security parameters from devices with those from Alexa
1M sites, to highlight any important differences between them. Similar to past work (e.g., [17], [24]), we
choose the following certificate/TLS parameters: cipher suite (algorithms used for hashing, key encryption,
key exchange and authentication, signature), SSL/TLS protocol version, and RSA key length.
4 Analysis and results
On October 8, 2016, we extracted certificates and TLS parameters (contained in a daily dump) from 299,858
TLS-supporting devices (out of a total of 1,018,911 devices), and from 598,888 HTTPS sites in Alexa Top
1M. The client used to extract TLS certificates are ZMap along with ZGrab (i.e., not following any popular
browser), which is later queried from Censys. In this section, we provide the results of our analysis and
compare the use of TLS/certificate parameters.
4.1 Prevalence of weak security practices
For each cryptographic primitive in a device certificate and TLS/SSL protocol banner, we compute the
percentage to compare the parameters between devices; see Figures 1–5 for a comparison of the weak cryp-
tographic primitives (for exact data, see Table 2). We also compare average values from devices with Alexa
sites (the last two bars). For brevity, we first highlight results for algorithms and parameters that are most
vulnerable. We also analyze certificate reuse in both devices and Alexa sites.
Hash functions in message authentication. The use of SHA1 is prominent in all device types (67.4%),
most notably in infrastructure routers (117,550, 99.4%) and network devices (35,918, 90.1%). In contrast,
SHA1 usage in Alexa 1M sites is far less (31.2%); see Figure 1. Some devices still use MD5, e.g., cameras
(817, 12%) and media devices (176, 16%). MD5 is broken for more than a decade now [34], and SHA1 is
also becoming subject to feasible collision attacks [31] (being phased out as of writing).
Hash functions in signature schemes. The MD5-RSA signature scheme is predominantly used in
devices, notably in printers (16,993, 74.9%) and infra. routers (64,879, 54.9%); see Figure 2. These devices
are vulnerable to certificate collision attacks, where attackers create certificates that collide with arbitrary




























































































































































































































Figure 4: Encryption algorithms













Infra. router 0.2 99.4 54.9 40.3 3.2 7.4 83.2 0 81.5 55.0 44.0 0.2
Modem 0.4 33.4 0.7 93.4 0.1 0 7.4 0 19.9 0.2 32.4 0
Camera 12.0 74.9 12.5 71.3 1.1 0.1 51.5 0.4 21.6 3.7 66.0 12.1
NAS 1.1 25.5 10.3 47.7 0.2 0 33.9 0.2 2.6 0.8 21.8 0.1
Home router 0.2 71.9 0.3 27.5 0 0 28.2 0 0.3 0.1 25.1 0
Network 0.3 90.1 1.8 94.9 0 0.4 90.0 0.3 6.2 0.9 84.4 0.1
Printer 0 84.2 74.9 13.4 0 0 71.5 0.9 24.3 0 82.4 0
Scada 3.7 84.0 11.6 55.4 2.0 0 49.1 2.6 14.5 4.1 67.6 1.1
CPS 0.3 44.7 3.6 81.0 0.7 0 12.9 19.7 2.8 1.0 19.7 19.4
Media 16.0 66.2 12.3 57.9 0.3 0.1 51.4 0.5 19.0 15.9 59.6 0.6
Device avg. 3.8 67.4 18.3 58.3 1.1 2.0 47.9 3.5 19.3 9.1 50.3 4.8
Alexa 1M 1.1 31.2 0.5 11.8 0 0 5.8 0.2 3.1 0 15.6 0.1
Table 2: Percentages of weak cryptographic primitives in devices; under Enc. alg., 3DES and RC4 represent
3DES-EDE-CBC and RC4-128, respectively.
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and CPS (703, 81%). A few devices (102) use “unknown” algorithms; according to a Censys author (email
correspondence), these algorithms are not parseable.
RSA key lengths. Certificates with 1024-bit RSA keys are deemed to be insecure as of early 2016; see NIST
SP 800-131A (at least 2048 bits should be used). However, many devices still use 1024-bit keys (Figure 3);
most notably infra. routers (98,432, 83.2%) and network devices (35,886, 90%). More seriously, we found
many devices with factorable 512-bit keys, e.g., infra. routers (3810, 3.2%), cameras (77, 1.1%) and scada
devices (76, 2%).
Encryption algorithms. We check the use of vulnerable ciphers such as RC4 (see e.g., [20], RFC 7465),
and 3DES (the recent Sweet32 attack [5]). Except infra. routers (96,433, 81.5%), the use of RC4 is relatively
low in other devices (Figure 4). Some Alexa sites still use RC4 (3.1%). Note that the ZGrab application
scanner as used with ZMap includes RC4 as a supported cipher (in addition to ciphers included in the Chrome
browser), to support older TLS servers. The use of 3DES is very limited overall, except in CPS devices (171,
19.7%). The use of ChaCha20-Poly1305 (currently being standardized, RFC 7905) as a replacement of RC4
























































Figure 5: SSL/TLS protocol versions
TLS/SSL version. TLS 1.0 is mostly used in net-
work devices (33,637, 84.4%) and printers (18,367,
82.4%), and TLS 1.1 in CPS (168, 19.4%); see Fig-
ure 5. TLS 1.0 is vulnerable to the BEAST at-
tack [14]. More seriously, many infra. routers (65,061,
55%) and media devices (175, 15.9%) use SSL 3.0 (vul-
nerable to the POODLE attack [25]). Surprisingly,
19,063 devices still support SSL 2.0 (deprecated in
2011, see RFC 6176). Top-5 such device types in-
clude: NAS (manufacturers: QNAP, NetGear, Syn-
ology; count: 5517), network (Cisco: 2006), printer
(Lexmark, Sharp: 1812), camera (HikVision: 1324),
and infra. router (Cisco: 1046). We do not include
SSL 2.0 in Figure 5 or other comparisons, as SSL 2.0
dataset is separately maintained by Censys.
Issuer org. Count % Trusted?
Western Digital 6846 0.67 ×
Synology Inc. 6461 0.63 ×
ZyXEL 4220 0.41 ×
GoDaddy.com 1412 0.14 1213
hw 1101 0.11 ×
TELMEX 1038 0.10 ×
TAIWAN-CA 818 0.08 818
COMODO 811 0.08 630
StartCom Ltd. 628 0.06 399
GeoTrust Inc. 622 0.06 538
Table 3: Top 10 organizations issuing device certifi-
cates (the last column represents browser trustwor-
thiness)
Certificate issuers. Most device certificates are self-
signed (71%), potentially making them vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The remaining
certificates are CA-signed; see Table 3 (total CAs:
1335). Some CA organizations are device manufac-
turers, others are browser trusted. Certificate data in
Censys contains a flag indicating the browser trusted
status (based on Mozilla NSS).
Certificate reuse. Some devices often come with
the same default certificate, which remains unchanged
afterwards. We group certificates according to their
SHA256 fingerprints for reuse detection.1 Many de-
vices reuse certificates (120,572, 11.83%), including in-
fra. routers (48,637, 4.77%), NAS (34,145, 3.35%), and
network (30,307, 2.97%). These devices may be vul-
nerable to MITM attacks (cf. SSH attacks [6]). Alexa
sites reuse certificates more commonly (38% of certificates are reused, mostly due to CDN, similar to past
studies, e.g., [33]); see Figure 6. Certificate reused by groups of 5+ Alexa sites/devices are relatively low.
The Common Name (CN) in most reused certificates contain non-routable IP addresses, e.g., 192.168.1.1
(27,082, 2.64%), generic identification labels, e.g., zxserver (1100), CyberoamApplianceCertificate (372), or
domain names, e.g., *.mynet.vodafone.it (1076), captive-portal.peplink.com (78).
1Certificates with the same public key may differ in other fields, resulting in different fingerprints. We did not analyze public
key reuse in certificates; the dataset we use from ZMap/Censys does not contain actual public key values.
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Figure 6: Unique certificates: Alexa 1M (total certs: 598,888) vs. devices (299,858)
DH prime number reuse. Many devices supporting Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange reuse prime
numbers. Such reuse can be exploited via the Logjam attack, enabling a man-in-the-middle attacker to
downgrade connections to export grade Diffie-Hellman [1]. There are (27,617, 2.71%) reused primes in
devices, including infrastructure routers (14,723, 1.45%), NAS (5479, 0.54%), modems (2748, 0.27%), and
network (2248, 0.22%). In contrast, only 0.2% of the Alexa sites supporting DHKE reused prime numbers.
4.2 Adoption of stronger cryptographic primitives
We also analyze the use of generally-accepted crypto primitives (as of Feb. 2017) in devices and compare with
Alexa 1M sites; see Figures 7–11 for a comparison of such primitives (for exact data, see Table 4). SHA256 is
extensively used in NAS (40,732, 73.4%) and Modems (17,031, 66.2%); these values are comparable to Alexa
1M sites (67.7%). The use of ECDSA signature algorithm is negligible in devices. SHA256WithRSA is used
in abundance in home routers (18,518, 72.1%) which is on par with the same of Alexa 1M sites (75.6%).
SHA512WithRSA is mostly used in CPS devices (80, 9.2%). RSA-2048 is used significantly in most device
types, except infrastructure routers, and network devices; only a small number of devices and Alexa sites
currently use RSA-4096 keys. For symmetric encryption, AES is used by both devices and Alexa sites.
4.3 A preliminary security rating of device types
For a quick overall overview of SSL security and comparison between device types, we create a preliminary
rating mechanism. We follow and adapt the guidelines (as needed) from the SSL Pulse project [30] (used to
rate SSL security of a given HTTPS site from Alexa 1M). We calculate the rating points as follows: take
percentages of cryptographic primitive implementations for each device type, multiply the percentages by
-1 (for weak primitives) or 1 (for strong primitives), and sum them up. For each cryptographic primitive
(e.g., hashing algorithm) and device type, the summed up value should fall within a range of -100 and 100.
We then assign letter grading to these values as follows: A (60 to 100), B (20 to 59), C (-20 to 19), D (-60
to -19), E (-100 to -61). For the resulting ratings, see Table 5. Alexa 1M sites (graded A) have relatively
high security compared to any of the device types. Infrastructure routers, cameras, networked devices and
printers are relatively insecure as opposed to modems, NAS and home routers.
5 Disclosure
The vulnerable devices we found are manufactured by hundreds of different companies; see Table 6. We





















































































































































































































































































Figure 11: TLS version: 1.2
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Infra. router 0.4 4.4 0 0 5.7 0.1 0.6 17.4 0.4 0.8
Modem 66.2 5.7 0.1 0 91.7 0.4 5.8 8.1 66.2 67.3
Camera 13.1 8.0 0.1 0 38.4 0.2 3.7 61.2 13.1 18.2
NAS 73.4 41.9 0.1 0 65.1 0.6 5.4 18.4 73.4 77.3
Home router 27.9 72.1 0 0 71.7 0.1 0.2 71.6 27.9 74.8
Network 9.6 3.1 0 0 9.4 0.1 3.7 80.2 9.6 14.6
Printer 15.8 11.7 0 0 28.4 0 0 59.1 15.8 17.6
Scada 12.3 32.1 0.1 0.1 46.7 1.5 12.0 58.6 12.3 27.3
CPS 55.0 6.2 9.2 0 85.8 0.2 4.7 17.9 55.0 59.9
Media 17.9 29.9 0 0 47.2 0.1 14.4 48.3 17.9 23.9
Device avg. 29.2 21.5 1.9 0.1 49.0 0.4 5.6 44.1 29.2 38.2
Alexa 1M 67.7 75.6 0.1 12.1 78.6 4.3 3.1 25.8 67.6 84.3































































































































































































Table 5: Security ranking by device types
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Manufacturer MD5 RC4 SSLv3 <RSA1024 Device types
Cisco 347 98,904 65,413 12,731 Network, infra. router
Hewlett-
Packard
1 5214 1 13 Network, printer,
scada, home router
AVM 78 5062 33 2 Modem
Hikvision 664 1085 214 75 Camera
QNAP 383 889 286 51 NAS
Table 6: Top 5 manufactures with vulnerable devices
our findings (Oct. 2016). As of writing, we got responses from Cisco, Honeywell, Hikvision, and Hewlett
Packard – most claiming to have released software/firmware upgrades in the past, but apparently, users did
not follow. Example responses include: [Honeywell] “This helps a lot and as we have looked almost all of
the systems you identified are “out of date” systems. Tridium/Honeywell released the patches to address
your findings almost three years ago with follow on updates each year. The end users are not updating their
systems to make them less vulnerable.”
6 Limitations and future work
Certain statistics as extracted from Censys appear to be unusual. For example, there is only one infras-
tructure router from manufacturers, e.g., DrayTek and LinkSys; Hewlett-Packard appears to have only one
device with MD5 and SSLv3. We communicated such observations to a Censys author, who attributed them
to be possible limitations of the current Censys logic, or device misconfiguration. Also, the SQL engine in
Censys is still evolving. Currently, it does not allow querying all device-related information in a flexible
structural format from the data available in ZMap. We plan to extend the comparison including all IPv4
web servers, when data hygiene and structure of data improve in Censys.
Overall, Censys provides a free and powerful interface to search and analyze all types of connected
devices. However, inherently, Censys excludes devices that cannot be reached via ZMap (e.g., private/non-
routable/firewalled addresses, opt-out from ZMap scanning). Newer IoT devices are increasingly adopting
IPv6 [12], which also cannot be measured by the IPv4-based ZMap scanner. More collective effort is also
needed to improve device tagging/annotating in Censys [15].
As apparent from several studies on the real-world deployment of web servers (e.g., [24], [17]), TLS can
provide tangible security benefit, only when it is configured properly. Partly due to several recent high-
profile measurement studies (e.g., [16], [1]), TLS security for user-facing servers is improving. However, we
found that many networked devices are still using weaker/broken crypto primitives in TLS, compared to
Alexa sites. Some vulnerabilities may have no effect if the services are accessed within a local network (e.g.,
inside a private home network), or via a modern browser—e.g., no current browser would accept the RC4
cipher or SSL 2.0, even if offered by a server. As these devices are varied (unlike regular web servers), actual
exploitation of their weaknesses will depend on how they are used/accessed. These seemingly obsolete attack
vectors can also be revived in the presence of a vulnerable TLS proxy between a modern browser and the
vulnerable server, such as an anti-virus proxy [13]; simply supporting SSL 2.0 can be exploited as well [4].
We hope our findings to raise awareness of this issue and positively influence the manufactures to push
appropriate firmware upgrades (possibly with auto-update).
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